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A Defense of ‘Strong Voluntarism’i 
 
Communitarians often argue that liberals construe the self as radically isolated 
from experience.  Sandel, for example, tells us that the liberal self is “an antecedently 
individuated subject, standing always at a certain distance from the interests it has.  One 
consequence of this is to put the self beyond the reach of experience, to make it 
invulnerable, to fix its identity once and for all” (1982, 62).ii  In contrast, Rawls insists 
that he does not need an invulnerable self; he has claimed that his theory, although 
Kantian, “satisfies the canons of reasonable empiricism” and avoids Kant’s reliance on a 
noumenal realm (Rawls 1977, 165).  Rawls’s communitarian critics argue that he fails in 
this task and attack him for relying on an unviable conception of the self as independent, 
isolated, and invulnerable. 
In this paper I do not defend Rawls against this criticism.  Instead, I defend the 
voluntarist picture of the self with which his critics saddle him.  Sandel’s talk of the 
“unencumbered self” may be cumbersome and vague, but it contains a kernel of truth.  I 
argue that Sandel rightly characterizes liberalism as requiring what I call “strong 
voluntarism” and I defend that voluntarism as part and parcel of an accurate portrayal of 
human agents.  In so doing, I am opposing the Rawlsian response to the communitarian 
critics and, along with it, the dominant recent trend in liberal thought, wherein theorists 
have sacrificed much of voluntarism, which I take to be an ability of the individual to 
choose what ends will be hers (which generally takes the form of deciding what ends to 
retain).iii  That this move has been accepted by many contemporary liberals (in modified 
forms) makes my own argument controversial. 
This paper has several sections. In the first, I explain Sandel’s criticism of Rawls 
and introduce “strong voluntarism.”  In section II, I examine Kymlicka’s response to 
Sandel, argue that it is incomplete, and begin to flesh out the conception of the self which 
is conducive to strong voluntarism. This last task is continued in section III.  In section 
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IV, I show that strong voluntarism and the concomitant view of the self as 
“unencumbered” fare better than the alternatives as explications of how we attribute 
moral value to our ends.  Finally, in section V, I support the account of the previous 
sections by showing that it matches our experience of “the real world” and in section VI, 




Sandel’s criticism of Rawls serves in this section primarily as an entrance into a 
discussion of the liberal self and its ability to choose.  Sandel’s criticism, in short, is that 
Rawls relies on a conception of the self that has it “distanced” from its ends, 
“invulnerable” to experience, not socially constituted in any way.  It is “antecedently 
individuated”—antecedently, that is, to experience—and as “antecedently individuated,” 
the Rawlsian self is meant to be isolated from experience, remaining what it is despite 
any social influences.  Given that the self is isolated from experience, the claim 
continues, experience has no effect on how the self chooses so that there are no (none 
self-imposed) limits on its choice.  Our choosing (between, admittedly, world-given 
options) is not affected by the world around us.iv  The world may provide the options, but 
it has no effect on us or how we choose.  This, many claim, is not a viable picture of 
volition.  Of course, they insist, the world effects us as much as our options. 
  In their rush to counter the communitarian charge, liberals have agreed with anti-
liberals that although we can sometimes choose our paths, there are essential limits (i.e., 
limits in principle) to voluntarist abilities.  They defend what we might call a “weak 
voluntarism,” wherein our choices are influenced, and oftentimes even determined by, 
our social context.v  Such a view, which we need not flesh out here, has ostensible 
advantages over the view of voluntarism just described.  It may seem, for example, to 
better accord with our dependence on the social world while still allowing us some 
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degree of control over our lives.  But accepting weak voluntarism concedes too much.  I 
argue below that the view of voluntarism I discussed in the previous paragraph, and 
which I call “strong voluntarism,” better accords with our intuitions about our autonomy.  
Strong voluntarism holds that although the world limits our options, we are always able 
to choose which of those options to accept—without our choosing itself being affected by 
the world.vi  In contrast, weak voluntarism allows that in addition to limiting options, the 
world sometimes determines our choice between otherwise ostensible options—and does 
so in principle, and not merely de facto.vii 
 
II 
In his later work, Rawls claims that his view has been misunderstood.  In 
particular, he claims that some mistakenly take him to rely on a view of persons such that 
“the essential natures of persons is [sic] independent of and prior to their contingent 
attributes” (1993, 27).  In response, Rawls says he “believe[s] the reply found in … 
Kymlicka’s Liberalism, Community, and Culture … [is] satisfactory” (1993, 27 note 29).  
In this section, I look more closely at Kymlicka’s reply. 
Kymlicka claims that Sandel’s view misunderstands liberalism, that liberalism 
does not require that “we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand 
ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible 
re-examination” (1988, 190 and 1989, 52).   What is necessary is only that “we can 
always envisage our self without its present ends.  But this doesn’t require that we can 
ever perceive a self totally unencumbered by any ends—the process of ethical reasoning 
is always one of comparing one ‘encumbered’ potential self with another” (1988, 190 and 
1989, 52-3; in the latter Kymlicka switches from plural first person to singular).  The 
liberal can agree, Kymlicka argues, that there “must always be some ends given with the 
self” and insist that “it doesn’t follow that any particular ends must always be taken as 
given with the self” (1988, 190 and 1989, 53).  It would be incumbent upon the 
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communitarian to demonstrate that “we can’t perceive our self without some specific end 
or motivation” (1988, 191 and 1989, 53; in all cases in this paragraph, italics in 
originals).viii 
The gist of Kymlicka’s argument is familiar.  It parallels, I suggest, Quinean and 
Sellarsian epistemology, in which it is argued that there are no truths immune to revision.  
Those theories do not claim that we can never take anything as provisionally given.ix  
They claim that although all beliefs are subject to revision, we can build upon a bracketed 
set of beliefs that we temporarily refuse to revise.  In the same way, Kymlicka suggests 
that although for the Rawlsian self all ends are subject to revision, it must always 
provisionally accept some ends as non-revisable.  This means only that we cannot re-
examine or revise all of our ends at once.  It does not mean that any are immune to 
revision.  “[N]o end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination.” 
Kymlicka’s argument is powerful.  It is not, however, the end of the dispute.  A 
Sandelian may reply that implicit in the ability to revise our ends is a view of the self as 
devoid of all “encumbrances”—even all at once.  Why is this?  The liberal conception of 
the self requires that the agent can always choose between its ends.  According to 
Kymlicka’s conception of the self, the agent can choose between any of its ends, but can 
do this only because she always provisionally retains some ends that ground her 
rationality—she is never devoid of all ends at one and the same time.  But this, I suggest, 
is quite beside the point. 
If Kymlicka’s defense of Rawls is sound, the agent can look at all of her relevant 
ends and desires as separate from her self (i.e., “with some distance”) so that she does not 
have to accept any as “constitutive” of her being.  For example, if I am choosing which 
car to buy, I thereby choose and accept one end as more “constitutive” of my being than 
other ends where this means that I accept it as more important to me.  In this way, my 
choice partially defines my personality.  I buy the family car, say, because I accept 
(choose) family stability as more defining of my character than “speed.”  My desire for 
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stability thus becomes defining of my character.  By choosing the Volvo over the 
Porsche, I make known what I value—what I take as important, as definitive of me.  
Further, in making that choice, I distance myself from all of my relevant ends so that I 
choose which shall be defining of me.  Moreover, when making the choice, I do not 
recognize my non-relevant ends as part of me.  I seem to myself entirely unencumbered.  
Neither the relevant ends (perhaps the desire for family stability or my opposing desire 
for speed and “fast times”) nor any non-relevant ends (perhaps my love of music) 
encumbers me in any sense I can appreciate while making the decision.  By my choice, I 
accept and make “constitutive” of who I am one of the relevant ends.  Prior to the 
decision, it is an open question who I am—am I a member of the so-called “fast-track” or 
a family man?  Although we generally have ideas about these questions before making 
such decisions, the decision itself settles the issue.  More to the point, any time it is a real 
question—any time I genuinely have a quandary or dilemma about what to do—only a 
decision can settle the matter.x  This is why the “role of our decisions and choices, of 
having come to care about one thing rather than another, is to settle what was, prior to our 
commitment, unsettled” (Raz, 389).  
It will be immediately suggested that although I am right to say that I was, in my 
example, distanced from the ends relevant to that choice, I was not distanced from all of 
my ends—even if I “feel” unencumbered, my other ends do influence me.  This may be 
correct, although how my non-relevant ends (such as my love of music) can influence me 
one way or another with regard to this decision, I do not know.  It may also be correct 
that without maintaining some of those ends I cannot be rational—cannot “engage in 
such reasoning” (Kymlicka 1988, 190; 1989, 53).  This I do not dispute.  What I wish to 
point out here is that if I can distance myself from all of my ends in this way—if in 
principle none is immune to revision—then I am something devoid of all of them.xi  None 
is essentially what I am.  This means not only that no one end is what I am, but also that 
even all of my ends put together is not what I am.  What I am is a being which chooses its 
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ends; my ends are how I am in the world (and it is the latter we generally question when 
asking “who are you?”). 
The point here is that a person’s ends may explain the way she is (and why she 
makes the choices she does), but they are not her.  What she is, is essentially an ‘I,’ a 
thing that can, in principle, choose to accept or reject any end it has.  That the agent can 
only choose because she has some ends that she accepts as hers for the sake of making a 
decision regarding other ends, is quite beside the point.  She would not have those ends at 
all had she not chosen them; they are only hers because she chooses them.xii  What the 
agent is, we might say, is an ego.   Of course, the ego does not exist alone.xiii  It will 
always have, this argument accepts, ends that attach to it (by its choice).  Given the 
attachment of chosen ends, we might say that although what the agent is, is an ego, how 
the agent is—the way it is—is with all the ends it has.  What I am as a self is different 
from the particular way I manifest myself.  We can say, then, that communitarians 
mistake how I am for what I am. 
The communitarian confusion between “how we are” (or “the way we are”) and 
“what we are” is especially clear in MacIntyre’s discussion of the unity of life as a 
narrative (1984, 204-226).  A narrative explains the way we are (and perhaps why we are 
that way), but despite MacIntyre’s claim, it does not answer the question “what is the 
self?”  The statements “the roles that it occupies” or “its narrative” answer, instead, the 
question “how is the self?” and, perhaps, “why is the self the way it is?”  The roles we 
occupy help us both to understand who we are (in the sense of “how am I now manifested 
in the world?”) and to become who we become, but they are not what we are.  When 
asked “what is a self?,” the proper response is not “the roles that it occupies,” for there 
are other factors involved in an accurate definition of the self and—importantly—the self 
chooses its roles and thus cannot be those roles.  Nor can the proper answer be “the 
narrative.”  Though this may be an identifying feature, it can not be the self; to say that it 
is, is to confuse the self with a description thereof, for it is always proper to ask “what is 
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Simon Caney gives us another way to understand the distinction I have just 
argued for between what a person is and how that person is (that is, how she manifests 
herself in the world).  He reminds us that, although communitarian theories may not 
recognize this, there are two senses of personal identity.  In the first, a narrow 
metaphysical sense, “the term ‘personal identity’ concerns the conditions under which a 
person may be said to exist over time” and remain the same person.  In the second, 
psychological, sense, it “denotes one’s character and self-understanding.  It refers to what 
one holds dear and regards as essential to oneself.”  As Caney points out, in the 
psychological sense what I am may change over time even if what I am in the narrow 
metaphysical sense does not (1991, 162; see also 1992, 274-5 and Flanagan 1991, 134). 
If my argument is correct, what I am in the narrow metaphysical sense is a 
choosing being, and what I am in the psychological sense (my “character”) is the person 
with the ends I contingently have.  The narrow metaphysical sense of personal identity 
seeks an answer to what a person is.  The psychological sense seeks an answer to how the 
person is (that is, “how she manifests herself in the world”).  It is because Sandel 
confuses the metaphysical and psychological, and because Kymlicka accepts this 
confusion, that his solution is incomplete. 
The	  stance	  I	  am	  defending	  is	  also	  similar	  to	  one	  discussed	  by	  Alisa	  Carse.	  	  As	  
she	   points	   out,	   the	   “liberal	   rejects	   radical	   choice,	   but	   …	   also	   insists	   on	   impartial	  
choice—choice	   that	   does	   not	   privilege	   from	   the	   outset	   the	   chooser’s	   particular	  
conception	  of	  the	  good.”	  	  What	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  not	  radical	  choice,	  but	  impartiality	  and	  
the	   “characterization	   of	   [the	   individual’s]	   independence”	   (Carse,	   196;	   italics	   in	  
original).	   	  The	  liberal	  self	  does	  not	  radically	  choose—does	  not,	  that	  is,	  choose	  from	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the	   standpoint	  of	   one	  with	  no	  ends—but	   chooses	   from	   the	   standpoint	  of	   one	   that	  
always	  has	  ends	  that	  are	  contingently	  possessed.	  	  	  
The	  communitarian	  may	  object	  that	  there	  are	  some	  ends	  from	  which	  I	  can’t	  
stand	  back	  (that	  without	  these	  there	  is	  no	  me),	  but,	  Carse	  points	  out,	  the	  liberal	  can	  
counter	   that	   those	   things	   that	   the	   communitarian	   insists	   I	   can’t	   stand	   back	   from	  
(loyalties	  to	  family,	  for	  example)	  are	  not	  relevant	  when	  building	  a	  moral	  or	  political	  
theory	  as	  Rawls	  does	  (Carse,	  196).xiv	  	  Thus,	  even	  if	  a	  liberal	  were	  to	  grant—as	  I	  think	  
she	  should	  not—that	   the	  communitarian	  were	  right	   that	  one	  could	  not	  stand	  back	  
from	  one’s	  attachments	  to	  one’s	  siblings,	  parents,	  or	  neighbors,	  she	  need	  not	  accept	  
any	   further	   conclusion.	   	   Those	   attachments—as	   any	   partialities—are	   simply	  
irrelevant	  when	  making	  moral	  judgments.	  	  That	  is,	  although	  they	  may	  be	  factors	  the	  
moral	   adjudicator	   should	   know,	   they	   should	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   detract	   from	   the	  
impartiality	  of	  the	  adjudication	  process.	   	  (I	  take	  it	  that	  when	  a	  judge	  tells	  a	   jury	  to	  
disregard	  a	  piece	  of	  information,	  he	  intends	  to	  disallow	  that	  information	  having	  an	  
impact	  on	  their	  adjudication.)	  	  The	  very	  motivation	  behind	  Rawls’s	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  
is	   just	   this,	   that	   it	  would	  be	   improper	   to	   let	   such	   factors	   influence	   the	  devising	  of	  
moral	   principles.	   	   This	  move	   is	   substantial	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   but	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	  
liberal	  can	  go	  a	  step	  further.	  	  	  
 
IV 
In	   the	  picture	   I’ve	  painted,	   the	   liberal	   claims	   that	   the	  agent	  can	   stand	  back	  
from	   those	   things	   the	   communitarian	   insists	   she	   can’t.xv	  	   In	   fact,	   that	   the	   liberal	  
agent	  can	  stand	  back	  from	  her	  relations	  with	  family	  and	  friends	  to	  choose	  whether	  
to	  accept	  or	  reject	  them,	  can	  make	  her	  ties	  to	  them	  of	  special	  moral	  significance	  in	  a	  
way	   the	   communitarian	   cannot	   recognize.	   	   The	   liberal	   agent	   can	   stand	   back	   and	  
choose.	  	  When	  she	  does	  so	  and	  decides	  to	  maintain	  a	  relationship,	  it	  says	  something	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important	   about	   that	   relationship.	   	   It	   says	   that	   she	   values	   the	   relationship	   as	  
something	  not	  to	  be	  given	  up.	  	  This	  is	  an	  option	  closed	  to	  the	  communitarian.	  	  	  
If	   the	   communitarian	   is	   right,	   the	   agent	   cannot	   stand	   back,	   evaluate,	   and	  
possibly	   reject	   his	   “constitutive”	   relationships	   with	   family	   and	   close	   friends.	   	   He	  
cannot,	   for	   example,	   decide	   to	   devalue	   and	   discount	   his	   relationship	   with	   a	  
controlling	  mother	  or	  abusive	   father.	   	  The	  communitarian	  agent	   just	   finds	  himself	  
with	   these	   attachments.	   	   In	   this	   light,	   that	   the	   communitarian	   takes	   these	  
constitutive	   attachments	   to	   be	   of	   special	   moral	   significance	   seems	   misguided.xvi	  	  
They	  cannot	  be	   rejected;	   the	  agent	  must	  maintain	   them	  whether	  he	  wants	  them	  or	  
not.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  liberal	  individualism	  allows	  for	  a	  morally	  richer	  understanding	  
of	  emotional	  ties	  and	  that	  such	  ties	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  more	  personal	  “depth”	  on	  
such	  a	  picture	  due	  to	  its	  reliance	  on	  strong	  voluntarism.	  	  Because	  we	  choose	  to	  keep	  
them,	   connections	   to	   others	   that	   can	   be	   opted	   out	   of	   (but	   are	   not)	  may	   be	  more	  
genuine	   than	   comparable	   ties	   we	   simply	   “find	   ourselves	   with.”	   	   Consider,	   for	  
example,	  a	  married	  couple	   that	  never	  consider	  divorce.	   	   It	  may	  be	   that	   they	  never	  
consider	   it	   because	   they	   are	   completely	   infatuated	   with	   one	   another	   or,	  
alternatively,	  because	  although	  they	  are	  unhappy,	  they	  have	  been	  taught	  that	  this	  is	  
how	  they	  should	  live.	   	  In	  either	  case	  (but	  especially	  the	  latter)	  actively	  considering	  
their	   options	  may	   be	   a	   positive	   event;	   in	   the	   first	   case,	   they	  would	   reaffirm	   their	  
love,	  in	  the	  second	  case,	  they	  would,	  perhaps,	  separate	  to	  lead	  better	  lives.	  
That our ties are sometimes valuable because we choose them does not, of course, 
require that choice is solely and entirely valuable for its own sake.  As Kymlicka points 
out, for choosing to be fully valued, we must endorse some good that we choose.xvii  This 
does not, however, alter the fact that what I am is a choosing being.  As a choosing being, 
there is also a very real sense in which who (or how) I am is who (or how) I choose to be, 
just as MacIntyre claims the individualist insists (1984, 220).  What the exchange 
between Rawls, communitarians, and Kymlicka brings out is that because we are subject 
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to causal influences, our choices are constrained.  I cannot choose to be just anything.  
The choices I am faced with are choices that come to me because of my place in society.  
Even more, some of those possibilities “force” themselves on me in a way that makes it 
difficult not to choose them—difficult even to recognize that I could choose to reject 
them.  Nonetheless, I could.  My failure to address particular ends manifests itself as a de 
facto choice to maintain them.  The more I do this, the less I live up to the liberal ideal.  
The ideal liberal person is one who (a) addresses—at some point in her life—all of her 
ends and (b) consciously and rationally decides whether to accept or reject them.  She 
need not, of course, do this all at once.xviii 
The picture I paint of the ideal liberal self is one wherein the self is a choosing 
being that, although necessarily encumbered, is not necessarily encumbered with any 
particular ends and is necessarily other than all her ends.xix  Any ends she happens to 
have, she has contingent upon her choosing them.  She can maintain rationality, as 
Kymlicka points out, because she does not put all of her ends up for grabs at the same 
time.  But, I am arguing, not putting all of one’s ends up for revision does not indicate 
metaphysical identification or equivalence with those ends. 
It	   remains	   true	   that	   the	   liberal	   chooser	   rationally	   evaluates	   as	   an	  
encumbered	   being	   (or,	   better,	   “with	   previously	   chosen	   encumbrances”).	   	   The	  
encumbrance,	   however,	   is	   always	   contingent	   and	   never	   essential,	   as	  
communitarians	  wish.	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  we	  must	  accept	  any	  particular	  ends,	  but	  
nor	   is	   it	   the	   case	   that	   the	   liberal	   self	   is	   incapable	   of	   rationality	   because	   of	   this	  
independence	  from	  her	  ends.	  	  For	  the	  liberal,	  we	  must	  only	  be	  able	  to	  see	  ourselves	  
“as	  the	  sorts	  of	  beings	  who	  can,	  in	  principle,	  stand	  back	  from	  our	  particular	  aims	  and	  
ideals	  and	  deliberate	   impartially”	   (Carse,	  197).	   	   It	   is	  not,	   though,	   just	   that	  some	  of	  
our	  ends	  are	  chosen	  and	  some	  unchosen.	  	  This	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  in	  fact,	  but	  the	  
liberal	   remains	  committed	   to	   the	  claim	  that	  all	   ends	  are	   in	  principle	   subject	   to	   the	  
agent’s	  choice;	  the	  liberal	  self	  is	  able	  to	  endorse	  or	  reject	  even	  the	  ends	  she	  has	  but	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has	   not	   chosen.	   	   As	   Rawls	   tells	   us,	   “free	   persons	   …	   regard	   themselves	   as	   always	  
capable	   of	   appraising	   and	   revising	   their	   aims	   in	   the	   light	   of	   reasonable	  
considerations	  …	  they	  are	  able	  to	  control	  and	  revise	  their	  wants	  and	  desires,	  and	  as	  
circumstance	   requires,	   they	   accept	   responsibility	   for	   doing	   so”	   (Rawls	   1993,	   280,	  
emphasis	  added).	  
What	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   this	   part	   of	   the	   debate	   between	   liberals	   and	  
communitarians	  is	  not	  whether	  liberalism	  fails	  to	  consider	  our	  ends,	  but	  whether,	  as	  
a	   theory	  of	  political	  morality,	   it	   should	  consider	   them	  and,	   if	   so,	  what	  weight	   they	  
should	   be	   accorded.	   	   Though	   communitarians	   may	   be	   right	   that	   we	   sometimes	  
discover	  ourselves	  with	  particular	  ends	  we	  have	  not	  chosen,	  all	  of	  our	  ends	  can	  be	  
rejected	   on	   reflection	   and	   that	  is	   morally	   relevant.	   	   Political	   theory	   must	   take	  
account	   of	   this	   pervasive	   feature	   of	   human	   agency;	   unlike	   communitarianism,	  
liberalism	  does	  so.	  	  Political	  theory	  may	  need	  to	  show	  concern	  with	  ends	  individuals	  
have	  through	  no	  choice	  of	  their	  own,	  but	  this	  concern	  is	  rightly	  subordinated	  to	  the	  
respect	  shown	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  choose	  one’s	  ends.xx	  	  The	  communitarians’	  failure	  to	  
recognize	  this	  causes	  them	  to	  misdescribe	  the	  self	  as	  necessarily	  encumbered	  with	  
particular	  ends.	  
Despite communitarian objections, we can make sense of ourselves as essentially 
agents of choice.  Communitarians also believe, however, that this is an undesirable view 
of the self that, if accepted, would “deprive us of those qualities of character, 
reflectiveness, and friendship that depend on the possibility of constitutive projects and 
attachments” (Sandel 1982, 181).  Communitarians are concerned that strong voluntarism 
leads to weaker social relationships and social decay.  If I defend strong voluntarism, 
then, I must also try to allay this fear.  I do so below (§ VI), but first I briefly give further 
reason to believe that real persons are accurately described as strongly voluntaristic. 
   
V 
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Despite their insistence that we are socially constituted—MacIntyre’s claim that 
social ties “constitute the given of my life” (1984, 220), Sandel’s insistence that such ties 
are constitutive “attachments” that we do not “voluntarily incur” (1982, 179), and 
Taylor’s claim that the individual possesses her identity by participation in community 
(see, for example, 1984, 182 and 1989a, 25-52)—communitarians sometimes recognize 
that we can and do distance ourselves from (any of) our ends.  Sandel admits that we can 
“distance” ourselves from our histories (1982, 179), MacIntyre insists that the self does 
not have “to accept the moral limitations” of its community (1984, 221), and Taylor 
claims that we can “radically re-evaluate” our own “most basic terms,” “in the sense that 
our looking again can be so undertaken that in principle no formulations are considered 
unrevisable” (1985a, 40).  They recognize that the agent is able to choose which ends to 
maintain and which to reject.  As some of these ends will be relationships to others, 
communitarians recognize that the agent will be able to opt out of any relationship she 
has.  This, in fact, is a central motivating fear for communitarians. 
[I]f the business of life is finding my authentic fulfilment as an individual, and my 
associations should be relativized to this end, there seems no reason why this 
relativization should in principle stop at the boundary of the family.  If my 
development, or even my discovery of myself, should be incompatible with a 
long-standing association, then this will come to be felt as a prison, rather than a 
locus of identity (Taylor 1985b, 283). 
The motivating fear described here is that individuals will be able to opt out of any 
relationship they happen to find themselves in—including relationships with spouses, 
siblings, and children.xxi  The liberal individual, it is feared, may find these relationships 
to be “a prison,” will thus want out of the relation, and will be able to opt out.   
There can be no doubt that individuals can opt out of any sort of relationship—
which is to say that there can be no doubt that individuals do seem to be strongly 
voluntaristic.  One need only flip through afternoon talk shows on television to hear 
stories of parents leaving (or killing) their children, children leaving (or killing) their 
parents, siblings leaving (or killing) each other, and of course, spouses separating (or 
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killing one another).  It is only too apparent that the ability to opt out of the closest 
relationship is a reality in contemporary society.  It is, I would suggest, the reality of this 
situation that drives critics of liberalism so forcefully.  They realize we can opt out and 
see people doing so in what seem to be perverse ways.  The ability to opt out, the critic 
claims, is pathological.xxii  If society were healthy, we would not see so many cases of 
people opting out of relationships that should remain “loci of identity.”  According to 
communitarians, this is the fault of liberalism. 
To blame societies’ ills on liberalism is, however, to conflate existing liberal 
society with the society of liberal theory, as if the former were an adequate realization of 
the latter.  Of course, some do claim that liberal theory itself encourages individuals to 
opt out of any relationship the moment that relationship seems to be more of a burden 
than a benefit, but this is simply an unfair characterization.  Liberal theory encourages 
individuals to see themselves as capable of opting out of any relationship, but this does 
not mean that we should not try to maintain relationships with those whom we are 
currently involved.  Seeing ourselves as capable of opting out, on the contrary, should 
give some indication of the high esteem and value we have for those with whom we 
remain in relationships.  We can opt out, but choose not to and this may be because of the 
high value we place on the relationship.    
We must recognize that if people were not strongly voluntaristic, they might not 
be able to opt out of relationships pathologically.  This gives some credence to the 
communitarian fear.  We must also recognize, however, that it is not this alone which 
results in pathological “opting out”—it does not cause the pathology.  Indeed, the ideal 
liberal individual (who is strongly voluntaristic) recognizes her need for others and seeks 
to maintain those relationships she has which are beneficial (not only economically, but 
also emotionally).  Whereas a communitarian individual would not believe he could opt 
out of a relationship and thus would not see himself as responsible for its continuation, 
Andrew Jason Cohen, “A Defense of ‘Strong Voluntarism’” Pre-Publication Version 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 35 No. 3, July 1998 (251-265).   P. 14 
the liberal choosing agent takes responsibility for the relationships she is in and seeks to 
further those that are positive. 
I should note here that the “opting out” of relationships—of which we have ample 
empirical data—is not, strictly speaking, evidence that we can fully distance ourselves 
from our ends (as strong voluntarism requires).  Many people opt out of relationships 
(disallowing contact with others) without it being the case that they have rationally 
distanced themselves from the relationship in question.  Empirical evidence that this 
latter occurs may only be anecdotal.  Some of us, at least, phenomenologically interpret 
ourselves as rationally distancing ourselves from so-called “constitutive relationships” so 
that we do not allow these to influence our behavior or who we are. 
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VI 
As already admitted, it is a troubling fact of our times that people seem to opt out 
of relationships too readily.  There may be something in contemporary society that 
encourages this activity, but to assume without argument that it is liberalism is to fall 
prey to a genetic fallacy.  It is not enough that a society is committed (in some form) to 
liberalism before the onset of a problem to blame it on liberalism.  Indeed, it is far from 
clear that there is evidence even for such a faulty argument.  In fact, a strong case can be 
made that relationships have been made stronger under liberalism.  Recognizing this 
should help to dispel communitarian fears.xxiii 
De Toqueville found early America lacking in many respects, but not in respect of 
the strength of its citizens’ relationships.  He claimed, for example, that “of all countries 
in the world America is the one in which the marriage tie is most respected and where the 
highest and truest conception of conjugal happiness has been conceived” (de Toqueville, 
291).  According to this outsider’s perspective, liberalism (Toqueville, of course, actually 
spoke of democracy) “loosens social ties, but it tightens natural ones.  At the same time 
as it separates citizens, it brings kindred closer together.”  “[F]eelings natural to man [e.g. 
parental feelings] … are always stronger if left to themselves” (see de Toqueville, 589).  
Freedom to opt out of relationships does not, according to de Toqueville, weaken 
relationships.  More recently, Gertrude Himmelfarb has discussed Victorian England, 
describing it as an “evolving democracy” where “all individuals were assumed to be free 
moral agents, [and] hence their own masters,” where “a premium [was put] on the self,” 
and morality was hoped to be a “voluntary exercise … on the part of each individual” 
(Himmelfarb, 51).  She argues (against Marx) that although responsibility came to be 
seen as located in each individual (Himmelfarb, 50), the family was elevated, “revered,” 
and “sentimentalized to a degree never known before” (Himmelfarb, 53).  So too, Robert 
Lane provides evidence that supportive relationships amongst workers are encouraged in 
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a market, which is meant to embody liberal principles (see Lane, 205-288, esp. 231, 235, 
252, 258; but also see 555-6).xxiv 
Though the evidence that relationships are stronger under liberalism than under 
non- (or anti-) liberal regimes is not definitive, it should make us take pause.  Still, there 
is no doubt that much evidence supports the view that individuals in liberal societies find 
it easier to opt out of relationships than individuals in other societies.  Divorce rates are a 
case in point.  Again, though, we must note that the ability to opt out of any relationship 
(included in strong voluntarism) does not cause people to do so pathologically.  The work 
discussed in the last paragraph, moreover, indicates an ambiguity about the “strength” of 
relationships.  What is indicated is a distinction between the “quality” and the 
“durability” of a relationship.  While communitarians are interested in durability, the 
evidence cited above concerns quality. 
In their talk of “traditions” and communal authority, communitarians are 
necessarily conservative (in the literal sense: they seek to conserve what already is).xxv  
What they fear is a society changing too rapidly for individuals to understand their place 
from day to day.  In the past times they romanticize, one supposedly knew who one was 
and what one’s roles were because these did not change often.  Indeed, they often did not 
change within a person’s lifetime.  Divorce rates were, of course, lower than they 
currently are.  Children respected their parents and cared for them in their old age, often 
following them in their careers.  Communities were more stable and accorded more 
authority simply because mobility was low.  In today’s society, on the other hand, 
mobility is high and people often opt out of their community—both geographically and 
otherwise.  Relationships are, we should agree, less durable than they once were (whether 
or not due to  liberalism).  On the other hand, as the authors discussed above point out, 
often-times those relationships are of higher quality even if shorter-lived. 
To the communitarian, then, a liberal may respond that she is unbothered by (or at 
least willing to accept) the lack of durability in contemporary relationships.  Such 
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durability, after all, often led to the oppression of some individuals by others—wives by 
husbands, for example.  In a world where relationships are not seen as having to be 
durable, individuals may be more able to protect themselves by opting out of self-
endangering situations.  Recall now what we said above (in § IV), that connections to 
others that can be opted out of (but are not) may be more genuine than ties we simply 
“find ourselves with.”  Endorsement of the continued relation imbues it with meaning.  
Combining the two claims that one’s choice imbues a relationship with meaning and that 
durability is not necessarily something to favor, the liberal can claim that it is quality and 
not durability of relationships that she is interested in.  If this does not provide for the 
long-term stability sought by the communitarian, so much the worse for the 
communitarian.  Durability has had negative consequences for the less powerful and 
high-quality relationships do provide support for individuals as well as some stability.xxvi 
In this section I have so far argued that liberalism is not at fault for the social 
pathology of our age—the extreme willingness of individuals to opt out of relationships.  
We should also note that the liberal is no worse off than the communitarian in this regard.  
It can be argued that it is anti-liberal communitarian policies which cause the pathology.  
The suggestion here is that as a society (and its government) surpasses its liberal 
responsibilities and operates in such a way so as to take from individuals the burden of 
responsibility they should properly have (according to the liberal), it becomes easier for 
individuals to walk away from relationships.  The individual no longer feels that opting 
out of a relationship is a personal loss or that he is responsible for the loss.  The blame for 
the loss is placed on the community and its traditions.  The attitude promoted is one 
where the society or its government is seen as at fault for citizen’s poor behavior and 
responsible for “making things right” (and capable of doing so).  Under a communitarian 
regime, for example, a parent might feel that he can opt out of a relationship with a child 
because he believes the government (society, community) should (and will) take care of 
the child.   
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I do not mean to insist that solidaristic or communitarian inclinations in our 
society are definitively responsible for the above-described pathology.xxvii  I can make this 
claim with no more certainty than communitarians can make their claim that liberalism is 
responsible for it.  It is, though, just as plausible and indicates that communitarianism is 




The	   discussion	   in	   sections	   I	   and	   II	   was	   meant	   to	   determine	   whether	  
communitarians	   are	   right	   about	   their	   characterization	   of	   the	   liberal	   self	   and	   to	  
determine	   precisely	  what	   sort	   of	   voluntarism	   an	   accurate	   portrayal	   of	   the	   liberal	  
self	   requires	   (and	  what	   that	   says	   about	   that	   portrayal).	   	   If	   the	   arguments	   I	   have	  
presented	  are	  correct,	  the	  arguments	  presented	  by	  Kymlicka	  et	  al	  do	  not	  succeed	  in	  
arguing	  against	  the	  communitarian	  characterization.	  	  They	  succeed	  only	  in	  showing	  
that	   reflective	   distancing	  does	  not	   hinder	   rationality	   and	   is	   conducive	   to	   our	   own	  
self-­‐perceptions.	  	  	  
In	  sections	  III	  and	  IV,	  I	  further	  developed	  and	  defended	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  
self	  that	  includes	  strong	  voluntarism.	  	  The	  belief	  that	  individuals	  can	  always	  choose	  
their	   ends	   requires	   a	   conception	   of	   the	   self	   whereby	   the	   ego	   is	   strongly	  
voluntaristic.	   	  Although	  Rawls	  and	  Kymlicka	  reject	   this	  move	  and	  accept	  what	   I’ve	  
called	   “weak	   voluntarism,”	   the	   arguments	   in	   these	   sections	   show	   that	   strong	  
voluntarism	  remains	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  liberals.xxviii	  
Discussing	  the	  social	  pathology	  of	  our	  age	  in	  section	  V	  allowed	  us	  to	  see	  that	  
the	   portrait	   I	   paint	   of	   strong	   voluntarism	   accurately	   describes	   individuals	   in	  
contemporary	   society.	   	   This	   is	   regretted	   by	   communitarians;	   but	   this	   regret	   is	  
misplaced.	   	  As	  discussed	   in	  section	  VI,	   strong	  voluntarism	  (and	   the	  corresponding	  
independence	   it	   implies)	   does	   not	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   social	   decay.	   	   I	   have	   not,	   of	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course,	   offered	   a	   remedy	   for	   our	   social	   pathology.	   	   I	   merely	   recognize	   with	  
communitarians	  that	  it	  is	  our	  social	  pathology.	  	  Against	  communitarians,	  I	  insist	  it	  is	  
not	  a	  result	  of	  strong	  voluntarism.	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i For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to Tom Beauchamp, 
Alisa Carse, Frank Chessa, Chandran Kukathas, Mark Lance, Wilhelmene Miller, 
Madison Powers, Henry Richardson, David Schmidtz, and Susan Stark and two APQ 
referees.  I am also grateful to all of those already mentioned and to Robin Fiore and Ian 
Maitland for conversations which helped clarify some points at issue here.  I must also 
thank Ruth Sample and Dale Turner for their comments and the audience at our 
symposium on the paper at the 1998 Pacific APA conference; although I could not here 
address all of the issues raised there, they were instructive.  Finally, I am grateful to the 
Institute for Human Studies at George Mason University for its support of this and related 
work. 
ii In his earlier work (see also 1982, 179 and 1984, 90-91), Sandel characterizes Rawls as 
subscribing to this view.  Although he no longer characterizes Rawls this way, he 
continues to saddle liberalism in general with this view (see 1996, 6, 12, 262, and 291).  
Given this, I will continue to talk of Sandel’s criticism, using Rawls only as a 
representative of the liberal tradition.  This should not be problematic as I will largely 
agree with his (here hopefully more clearly explained) characterization of liberalism. 
iii Following a customary device, I use “ends” as a place holder for such commitments as 
relationships, loyalties, projects, etc.  “Choosing one’s ends” can be as simple as 
choosing to exit a room or as complex as choosing a career, a spouse, or even one’s 
religion.  
iv As this criticism continues, we are told that liberals “would describe … values and 
conceptions of the good as the products of choice or decision” (Sandel 1982, 162).  
Liberals, the critic charges, elevate choice so that it determines value.  Given this, 
communitarians seem to hold that the liberal should not—apparently on pain of 
inconsistency—be concerned with what one chooses so long as one chooses.  Kymlicka 
puts this point to pasture nicely by arguing that (1) certain paradigmatic liberals did not 
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hold such a view and that (2) such a view is absurd, so to attribute it to anyone who 
doesn’t explicitly state it is too uncharitable.  The view is absurd as it leads to the 
conclusion that if I keep choosing I am made better off—even if my choices “undo” each 
other.  See Kymlicka 1988, 182-185 or 1989, 15-19 and 47-52. 
v This concept is necessarily difficult to flesh out.  It is meant to characterize the 
communitarian view, which is unclear.  Communitarians often insist that we cannot 
choose our ends (that we simply “discover” ourselves with them), but sometimes suggest 
that we can.  See the first paragraph of § V below.  
vi One example: strong voluntarism recognizes that if he grows up in (and is confined to) 
an area where being a lumberjack is impossible, an agent cannot choose to be a 
lumberjack; it insists, though, that the strongest familial ties to and endorsement of civil 
service, for example, can be rejected. 
vii Despite the language, I am not here discussing free will.  Strong voluntarism is, I think, 
compatible with hard or soft metaphysical determinism as well as metaphysical 
libertarianism.  (It’s compatible with hard determinism as it does not speak at all to 
biological determinants; when I speak of “the world affecting choosing,” it is the social 
world to which I refer.) 
viii Kymlicka goes on to argue that the communitarian tries, but fails, to show just that: 
that we must see ourselves with communal ends. 
ix Sellars insists that “empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension science, is 
rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise 
which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once” (1963, 170).  Similarly, 
Kymlicka insists that a self can put any claim in question, though not all at once. 
x I do not mean to claim that we should always make choices in the way here discussed.  
Nor do I deny that there are persons who never do so.  Strong voluntarism holds only that 
they can, not that they will.  My form of liberalism holds that there are times they should. 
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xi This, admittedly, relies on a bit of phenomenology (as per the end of § V).  My view 
might be indicated by analogy:  if we had a glass that (ex hypothesi) always had some 
liquid in it, though that liquid changed over time, we would not say that the liquid 
contributed to what the thing was.  The “thing” is a glass—devoid of all liquid—even 
though there is never a moment when it has no liquid.  So too, the self is a choosing 
being—devoid of all ends—even though there is never a moment when it has no ends. 
xii Being a choosing being, of course, presents problems.  See, Gerald Dworkin (1982, 
especially pages 50-54) for an interesting and lucid discussion.  See footnote 17 below. 
xiii I do not mean to import a Freudian schema. 
xiv Carse’s view is that whether any particular ends are morally relevant is itself a moral 
question.  The liberal insists that communitarian ends are not.  See also Caney, 1992 
(278) and footnote 8 above. 
xv Although there may be times—when considering whether to save one’s child or a 
stranger from a danger, for example—when it is not morally permissible to so distance 
oneself, there are other times—when considering issues of social justice, for example—
when it is not only permissible, but required. 
xvi See, for example, Sandel’s claim that if it weren’t constitutive, an attachment would be 
“merely an attribute” (1982, 150; italics added). 
xvii Although I agree that a life spent choosing with no good endorsed is not a worthwhile 
life, I also take choosing to be intrinsically valuable.  It is, I suggest, both intrinsically 
and instrumentally valuable. 
xviii (a) This, I believe, goes some way in explaining why classic liberals took fully 
developed autonomous persons as basic theoretical building blocks.  Children and others 
unable to choose their ways of being are not ideal liberal persons.  (b) Liberalism does 
not need to claim that any persons actually live up to this ideal.  (c) If I fail to reject an 
end—whether because I explicitly accept it or because I fail to question it—the end is 
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part of how I am.  So too, if I mistakenly or self-deceptively accept an end that I can’t or 
don’t act on (although such an end would presumably be a part of how I am in a different 
way). 
xix As per Sandel (1982, 55), this is a possessive model of the self: it possesses, and thus is 
not, its ends. 
xx I am not, of course, saying that political theory should show no concern with the plight 
of individuals who lead lives impoverished in some way because of ends that have been 
unfortunately ingrained into them (for example, a woman who has been socialized to 
believe her husband’s happiness is more important than her own).  Respect for the ability 
to choose one’s ends, in fact, may indicate that this ability should be fostered where 
lacking.  Other than using education for such fostering, however, state interference may 
be disallowed if there is no other concern.  For a sustained discussion of this problem see 
Meyers, 1989. 
xxi What I say here about personal relationships is a fortiori true of less personal social 
ties that allow for social solidarity and fellow-feeling. 
xxii Axel Honneth talks of social philosophy as providing an account of society such that it 
suffers from a particular social pathology.  For Taylor, the pathology is the “ethical 
impoverishment of subjectivity.”  That impoverishment includes the ability to opt out of 
relations we should not want to opt out of. 
xxiii The next paragraph is due largely to Ian Maitland’s synopsis of the cited material in his "The 
Communitarian Critique of the Market," a presentation on March 22, 1996 to the Connelly Ethics Seminar 
at Georgetown University (draft). 
xxiv For an opposing view, see Putnam, 1995.  Putnam makes much of the empirical fact 
that although more people are bowling, fewer are doing so in leagues (this holds for other 
activities as well).  He takes this as evidence that people are now less social.  But this is 
suspect.  Contrary to what Putnam may think, most people do not literally “bowl alone.”  
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They bowl with friends.  Hence, the drop in league bowling indicates only a shift away 
from structured socializing.  People still socialize, the modes of doing so are simply less 
rigid. 
xxv On this point, see Hampton 1997, 190. 
xxvi Some have claimed that the contemporary legal structure has made it more difficult 
for women and children to protect themselves than in the past (see, for examples, 
Glendon 1981 and Sandel 1996, 91-122).  I cannot fruitfully comment here on the 
legalities such authors discuss, but note that such claims should only negatively impact 
on one’s views of liberalism if it is adequately shown that liberalism is the direct cause of 
those legalities. 
xxvii Certainly, government (and community) services have increased in the last 30 years 
as social bonds have become more fragile.  I am unaware of any empirical evidence 
relating these two, but a statistical correlation would certainly be interesting.  Even given 
such evidence, I fear this debate would remain at a stand-off, with both sides able to 
invoke empirical evidence supporting their views. 
xxviii I cannot here show that liberalism requires strong voluntarism rather than weak 
voluntarism. 
